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Abstract 
This paper reports on an analytical comparison between the foreign debt build-up that 
preceeded the 1982 debt crisis in Latin America and the current debt accumulation process taking 
place in Eastern Europe. In the whole, Eastern Europe's debt position seems more sustainable 
than Latin America's in the early 1980s. While the former is equally indebted and shows higher 
country concentration (around Russia), greater potential for fiscal impact, and no superior 
macroeconomic environment, its debts are less globally significant, have better repayment terms, 
are supported by better repayment capacities (in turn due to larger trade openness and virtually 
no capital flights), and are accumulating at a slower pace in a much more favorable international 
economic situation (faster growth in World-wide output and trade, and low and declining interest 
rates). This sets Eastern Europe apart from Latin America in the early 1980s but, of course, does 
not mean that its indebtedness is sustainable. 
J.E.L Classification: F34, Gl5 
IS THERE A LA TIN-AMERICAN DEBT CRISIS BUILDING UP IN EASTERN EUROPE? 
A COl\1P ARA TIVE ANALYSIS 
"As banking developed from the seventeenth century on, so, with the 
support of other circumstances, did the cycles of euphoria and panic. 
Their length came to accord roughly with the time it took people to 
forget the last disaster --for the financial geniuses of one generation to 
die in disrepute and be replaced by new craftsmen who the gullible and 
gulled could believe had, this time but truly, the Midas touch." 
John Kenneth Galbraith (1975) 
Introduction 
Between 1990 and 1996, the net flow of capital' to the developing countries almost tripled to 
US$ 285 billion; their net inflow oflong-term debt more than doubled (to just under US$ 100 
billion p.a, or about 2 percent of their combined GNP, in 1996); and their inflow of foreign 
direct investment more than quadrupled (to US$11 0 billion p.al. This dramatic increase in 
capital inflows did not spare the countries of Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union (FSU) 
who saw, and continue to see, their annual net intake of capital increase from under US$ 15 
billion in 1990 to about US$ 45 billion (or 3.5 percent of their combined GNP) in 1996; in 
cumulative terms, over half of that intake has taken the form of debt. 
1 I "Net flow of capital " refers here to "aggregate net resource flows", that is, the sum of official development 
finance (grants and loans) and private flows (debt, foreign direct investment and portfolio equity). See World 
Bank ( 1997a) for further explanation. 
2 I Our definition of 'developing country' follows the defmition used in World Bank (l997b ). 
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The literature on debt accumulation, sustainability and crises is plentiful. Outright lender myopia 
(Galbraith, 1975; Devlin, 1989); the 'pull' attraction of favorable domestic policy settings and 
the 'push' conditions in international financial markets (Fernandez-Arias, 1996); and the 
determinants of flow 'reversals' (Dadush et. a/., 1994; Shadier, 1994) have all been offered as 
possible explanations for seemingly cyclical surges in debt flows that can be traced back to the 
early nineteenth century (Eichengreen and Lindert, 1989). Lessons from past debt crises have 
also been widely drawn by the literature (Stallings, 1987). Similarly, the latest increase in capital 
flows to the group of developing countries (which began in the late 1980s) has been the object of 
vast empirical analysis as well (Schadler et. a!., 1993; Fernandez-Arias and Monte!, 1996; 
Dooley et. al., 1996). 
There has been, however, relatively little specific focus on the debt flowing toward Eastern 
Europe. Its rapid accumulation of liabilities is of particular interest, though--it is taking place 
among economies that are undergoing a formidable transition away from central planning.3 This 
raises a critical question: Is that debt accumulation sustainable, or are those economies heading 
for a debt crisis? Kapur and van der Mensbrugghe (1997) point to the Eastern European (and 
other FSU) countries' fast borrowing performance and to the potential negative effect that easily 
forthcoming financing could have on their policy commitment to structural reform. 
This paper attempts to advance the analysis of Eastern Europe's on-going debt accumulation 
process by comparing it to the debt accumulation process that preceded the Latin American debt 
3 I For a thorough description of the transition experience, see World Bank (1996 ). 
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crisis of the early 1980s. It reports on key country and international conditions in both situations, 
and places Eastern Europe in the quantitative context of the Latin-American crisis in-the-making 
of the late 1970s and early 1980s. This allows for the identification of some reassuring, as well 
as some worrisome, trends (Section II), and for the drawing of some broad sustainability-related 
conclusions (Section III). 
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II. A Tale of Two Accumulations: Comparing Latin-America to Eastern Europe 
The analysis presented in this section is based on four Latin American countries (Argentina, 
Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela) which, in 1981, the year before Mexico stopped servicing its 
debt and unlocked a series of country defaults, accounted for 70 percent of that region's US$ 224 
billion long-term debt, and on four Eastern European countries (the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland, and the Russian Federation) which, in 1996, held 55 percent of the US$ 346 billion long-
term debt of their region (including the FSU( Our basic data and calculations for those 
economies are presented in Tables I and 2. 
a) The Bad News 
Four main characteristics of Eastern Europe's current debt position as compared to Latin 
America's in the period leading to the 1982 debt crisis raise concerns over the former's 
sustainability. First, the Eastern European countries are as indebted today as their Latin 
American counterparts were right before their debt crisis. In both cases, total debt to GNP ratios 
move around 30 percent. Hungary, the most indebted of the two samples (63 percent of GNP) 
has at present proportionally twice as much debt as Mexico did in 1981.5 
Second, a larger portion of the Eastern European debt is public or publicly-guaranteed, and a 
larger portion of it is officially supplied. This, while possibly reducing financing volatility, sets 
4 I Our samples include 29 countries in the Latin American and Caribean region, and 27 in Eastern Europe and 
the FSU. 
51 It is worth mentioning that the notion that Eastern European countries started their post-Soviet-Union debt 
accumulation process from very low levels is not univocally supported by the data: in 1990, total debt to GNP 
ratios were 20, 67, 88, and 10 percent for Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Russia, respectively. 
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the stage for a larger fiscal impact in case of an exogenously-driven crisis. In average, about 70 
percent of the Latin American debt was guaranteed by the borrowing country's state in 1982; that 
proportion hovers around 90 percent among the Eastern European countries today (and is 
virtually 100 percent in Russia). Surprisingly, and with some variation across countries, private 
resource flows6 are much less important than official ones in Eastern Europe today compared 
with Latin America in the early 1980s. For each US dollar flowing into Latin America, less than 
ten cents were from official sources in the pre-crisis period; that proportion ranges from seven 
cents -Czech Republic- to 6 dollars --Russia-- in Eastern Europe. 
Third, Eastern Europe's debt is much more concentrated than Latin America's during the 1980s. 
Russia holds 60 percent of the total debt stock of our four-country Eastern European sample, and 
28 percent of the total debt stock of Eastern Europe and the FSU. Brazil, the largest Latin 
American debtor in 1981, held just over a third of our country sample's debt (Mexico held the 
other third), and a quarter of the region's. And, in comparable dollar prices, Brazil's total debt 
stock in 1981 was only 8 percent larger than Russia's in 1996. 
Fourth, the domestic macroeconomic frameworks among Eastern European countries are not 
fundamentally different from those in Latin America in the period leading to the 1982 debt crisis. 
With the exception of the Czech Republic, the Eastern European are running fiscal deficits that, 
in proportion of GDP, are similar to those seen among Latin American countries in 1981 
(Russia's fiscal deficit is worse than Mexico's in 1981). Also similar are gross domestic saving 
6 I For definition of resource flows, see footnote I. 
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ratios (Poland's is far lower than any Latin American comparator in the sample). With the 
exception of Hungary, real effective exchange rates amongst Eastern Europeans are on as steep 
an appreciation path as they were in Latin America in the the five years leading to the 1982 crisis 
(Russia's 46 percent average annual appreciation over each of the last four years beats the 
tab/ita-led real effective appreciation of Argentina's currency in the four years before 1982). 
Also, while the Latin American economies were growing apace before the 1982 crisis, the 
Eastern European countries, involved in major market transitions since the early 1990s, only 
recently reached moderate, positive real GDP growth (not yet Russia). 
While current account imbalances in Eastern Europe are not as serious a problem as they were in 
Latin America, their sustainability cannot be taken for granted (although Russia shows a surplus, 
Hungary's deficit-- -3.8 percent ofGDP --is not very different from Mexico in 1981). 
Following Dadush and Bralunbhatt (1995), we have computed the deviation of each country's 
current account position at each point in time from the so-called 'sustainable' current account 
ratio (according to this rule-of-thumb indicator, deviations above 2 are considered non-
sustainable in the long-run because export growth fails to cover for foreign liability servicing). 
Eastern Europe's deviations are 'sustainable' (i.e., consistently below 2), but so were Latin 
America's, every single year, and in every single sampled country, before the 1982 debt crisis. 
Finally, the risk rating (as measured by Standard and Poor's indexes) of the sovereign debt of the 
Eastern European countries in our sample have been, in the whole, encouraging (Hungary and 
Poland have been upgraded from speculative to investment grade), signaling market confidence 
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in, among other things, these economies macroeconomic environment. It should be pointed out, 
however, that similar (also S&P) ratings for Venezuela (the only Latin country we have found 
ratings for in the early 1980s) were consistently triple AAA, even a year before the advent of the 
debt crisis. 
b) The Good News 
The factors described above point to a debt position of doubtful sustainability among Eastern 
European countries. There are, however, six main positive characteristics that differentiate 
Eastern Europe's current debt build-up from Latin America's in the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
First, the relative international significance of those regions' indebtedness: in 1982, Latin 
America's long-term debt stock was equivalent to 2 percent of the World's GNP, 9 percent of its 
global trade, and about half of the liabilities of the group of developing countries. Eastern 
Europe's debt is much less globally significant than its Latin counterpart in the early 1980s: the 
corresponding indicators for Eastern Europe and the FSU in 1995 were I, 5, and 20 percent, 
respectively. Two main factors account for that difference. First, capital flows to the developing 
world are now much less regionally concentrated (in 1981, 48 percent of the net aggregate 
resource flows to developing countries had Latin America as their destination, while in 1995 no 
region attracted more than 40 percent of that flow, and only 17 percent went to Eastern Europe). 
Second, although net capital flows to the developing World are currently over 60 percent larger 
than in the early 1980s (US$ 285 billion in 1996 vis-a-vis US$ 173 billion in 1981, in 1996 
constant US$ prices), their instrument composition has dramatically change away from debt in 
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favor of equity. Today, over half of those flows take the form of stock purchases and foreign 
direct investment. 
Second, the Eastern Europe countries appear to have a better repayment capacity than their 
Latin American counterparts in the early 1980s. This is due, primarily, to the much larger 
degree of openness among the European economies. Even Russia, the 'most closed' economy 
among the Eastern Europeans (with a ratio of exports and imports of goods and non-factors 
services to GDP ofabout40 percent in 1996) is 'more open' than Venezuela, the 'most open' 
among the Latins in the early 1980s (30 percent in 1983). This translates into much lower debt, 
debt service, and interest payments to export ratios. For instance, although total debt to GNP is 
higher in Hungary in 1996 than in Mexico in 1982, Hungary has half the rate of debt to exports. 
Similarly, while the Latin American countries saw a sharp and continuous decline in their 
international reserves (expressed in months worth of imports) in the years leading to the 1982 
debt crisis, the Eastern European economies have witnessed a virtually uninterrupted increase in 
their reserves since 1990, reaching levels that are far more reassuring than those seen in Latin 
America in the 1980s (5, 7, 5, and 3 months worth of imports in Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland, and Russia in 1996, respectively, vis-a-vis 3, 0.8, 0.4 and 4 in Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, 
and Venezuela in 1982). 
Third, the average terms of Eastern Europe's debt are, in general, not only better than those 
governing Latin American debt in the late 1970s and early 1980s, but have also been improving 
since 1990. The proportion of short-term debt to total debt increased constantly in all the Latin 
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countries in our sample over the five years that preceded the Mexico-led debt crisis, reaching 
levels that were clearly difficult to maintain (from about a fifth of the total debt in Brazil to more 
than half in Venezuela). The debt maturity structure is sharply different in Eastern Europe: with 
the exception of the Czech Republic (where a rather-constant third of the debt is short term), 
these countries have been systematically reducing their proportional short-term indebtedness 
since 1990, from about a fifth to about a tenth or less at present (notably, Poland virtually 
eliminated its short-term debt). Similarly, the proportion of concessional debt7 to total debt 
shrank continuously to almost negligible levels in Latin America in the five years before the debt 
crisis (from low starting levels; e.g., in 1978, the country with the highest proportion of 
concessional debt was Brazil, with only 4 percent ). In contrast, the Eastern European countries 
have increased the share of concessional debt in total debt manifold since 1990 (a fifth of 
Russia's debt and a quarter of Poland's is now on concessional terms). Finally, the Latin 
American debt of the early 1980s was about twice as expensive as Eastern Europe's today. After 
a continuous increase since 1978, the average interest rate on new commitments to private 
creditors ranged, in 1981, between 12 percent p.a. (Argentina) to 17 percent p.a. (Venezuela). In 
Eastern Europe, that rate has fallen by about a quarter since 1990, and ranges from about six 
percent p.a (Hungary) to about eight percent p.a. (Poland)8. Put together, the better terms of the 
Eastern European debt also imply a lighter debt service burden on the Government's budget as 
compared to Latin economies (that ratio was as high as 70 percent in Latin America in 1981--
Argentina-, and is at most a third --Hungary-- among Eastern Europeans). 
7 I Defined as loans with an original grant component of 25 percent or more. 
8 I Latest available data: 1995. 
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Fourth, Eastern Europe's debt is not accumulating as rapidly as Latin America's in the late 
1970s and early 1980s, putting less pressure on the country's overall absorptive capacity and, 
ultimately, on its capacity to repay. For instance, in Argentina, the fastest Latin borrower, the 
total stock of debt (in current dollar terms) grew by an average 3 5 percent each year during the 
five years that preceded the 1982 debt. crisis. No country in our Eastern European sample can 
match that speed, not even the Czech Republic with its average debt growth of about 18 percent 
p.a. over the last six years. 
Fifth, among the Eastern European countries, there is no evidence of the kind of pre-crisis 
capital flight (i.e., large outward shifts of capital from residents) that was common among Latin 
American economies in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Claussens and Naude (1993) provide an 
inventory of methods to calculate capital flight; here we have followed the so-called World Bank 
methodology. Our calculations confirm that all Latin American countries experienced large (and 
increasing) capital flight in the four years that preceded the 1982 debt crisis [a finding that has 
been documented elsewhere in the literature --Cumby and Levich (1987), for instance]. In 
contrast, capital flight from Eastern Europe have been more episodic: Hungary in 1990 and 1994, 
Poland in 1991 and 1992, and Russia in 1994 (we find no evidence of capital flight in the Czech 
Republic). 
Sixth, the international economic setting that accompanied the Latin American debt build-up 
deteriorated rapidly over the half-decade before the 1982 crisis. The Eastern European 
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economies are conducting their borrowing in a much more favorable global environment. 
Growth in the World's GDP and in global trade fell continuously from 1978 untill982, when 
they carne to a virtual stall (0.2 and -1.2 percent p.a., respectively). At the same time, LIB OR 
rates increase by more than half (reaching almost 14 percent in 1982). International economic 
conditions have been very different during the 1990s: the World's economy has been growing 
steadily (currently, at well over two percent p.a.), international trade has boomed (increasing by 
more than five percent p.a. each year since 1990), and LIBOR rates have hovered around 6 
percent p.a. 
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IlL Concluding Remarks 
This paper has reported on an analytical comparison between the foreign debt build-up that 
preceded the 1982 debt crisis in Latin America and the current debt accumulation process taking 
place in Eastern Europe. In the whole, Eastern Europe's debt position seems more sustainable 
than Latin America's in the early 1980s. While the former is equally indebted and shows higher 
country concentration (around Russia), greater potential for fiscal impact, and no superior 
macroeconomic environment, its debts are less globally significant, have better repayment terms, 
are supported by better repayment capacities (in tum due to larger trade openness and virtually 
no capital flight), and are accumulating at a slower pace in a much more favorable international 
economic situation (faster growth in World-wide output and trade, and low and declining interest 
rates). This sets Eastern Europe apart from Latin America in the early 1980s. 
Our findings coincide with Dadush et. al. (1994) who, analyzing the possibility of capital flow 
reversals for developing countries in general, see no immediate signs for concern. Their 
judgment is based on four reasons: foreign direct investment accounts for a majority of the flows; 
much of the recent debt accumulated in developing countries is in the form of bond and equity 
issues rather than the more volatile commercial loans that were common in the 1970s; capital 
flows to developing country are a small share of the portfolios ofOECD investors; and a 
substantial, protracted increase in international interest rates is unlikely. 
The above can hardly guarantee a debt-crisis-free Eastern Europe, though. The fact that debt 
accumulation among these countries is proceeding on a sounder track than it did among their 
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Latin American counterparts in the late 1970s and early 1980s does not necessarily mean that the 
accumulation is sustainable. Equally important, the currently very favorable global economic 
environment cannot be taken for granted; it was the deterioration of this environment that 
triggered the Latin American debt debacle. [Brocket. a!. (I 989) offer a thorough analysis of the 
main factors which contributed to the debt crisis]. In this sense, this paper's comparisons 
provide a useful reference check (e.g., had Eastern Europe measured poorly vis-a-vis 1980s Latin 
America), rather than an absolute indication of long-term debt sustainability. 
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Table 1: Selected Economic Indicators for Selected Eastern European Countries, 1990-1996 
Czech Republic Hungary 
1990[ 
""I 1992 1993[ 1994 1995 1996 19901 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
l. D-ebt Statislits (milliou USS) I 
T cui Debt Stock 6383.3 8031.9 757\.7 9173.8 10694.9 16576.0 \7937.0 21276.!i 22624.0 21975.1 24249.8 28082.7 31247.7 30178.0 
LClng·lenn debt 3983.3 4974.9 4700.7 6099.2 7806.0 l\503.7 12404.0 ]8006.4 19187.7 18484.8 21013.7 24544.7 27660.1 26599.0 
Public and Publically Ouar:anateed 3983.3 4972.9 4690.2 5881.6 7037.7 9609.9 9842.0 18006.4 18931.1 17843.3 19795.7 22156.9 13571.6 22005.0 
Private Nongu.ar;ntecd 0.0 2.0 10.5 211.6 768.3 1893.9 2562.0 0.0 256.6 641.6 1218.0 2387.8 408!U 4594.0 
Pllblic and Publically Guaranteed Debt B.S a% of Total Long· 
tem1 Debt 100.0 ]00.0 99.8 96.5 90.2 83.5 79.3 ]00.0 98.7 96.5 94.2 90.3 85.2 82.7 
Pri"Yate Nonsuaranteed O.:bt as a% of Total Long-term Debt 0.0 0.0 0.2 3.5 9.8 \6.5 20.7 0.0 u 3.5 5.8 9.7 14.8 17.3 
1[, Crrdit Worlhines! Indicators(%) 
1oul Debt/Exports 50.2 54.2 67.4 56 172.8 180.5 157.8 212.4 245.5 174.2 151 
l"(llal Debt/GNP 20.2 33 27.1 29.5 29.7 37 34 67.2 70.7 61.7 
" 
70.2 72.8 63 
J()U] Debt Service/Exports .. 7.6 12.7 10.5 9 34.3 31.9 35.7 38.7 49.3 39.1 26 
lllterest Payments/Exports 2.6, 2.5 3.7 
' 
13.71 13.2 JJ.3 13.3 15.1 1 1.8 lO 
I111erest Payments/GNP 1.6 ul 2 ul 14 2 5.31 5.2 5.2 4.1 4.3 4.9 
Ir.temational Reserves/Imports (monthly) 31 4 7 5 II 4 4 5 5 7 7 
llltemational Reserves/Total Debt 49.6! 65 88.2 76 5.61 17.8• 20.3 28.1 2441 38.7 42 
Short Term/Total Debt 37.61 26.7 23.7 21.81 27 30.6 31 13.8 9.6 10.4 8.3 8.5 10.3 II 
Concessionalffotal Debt 2.8 6.8 9.9 91 8.6 6.1 I 041 04 0.5 0.8 1.2 1.7 2 
Multilateralffotal Debt 0 0 04 0.61 0.8 0.8 6 12.01 14.7 14.7 13.3 12.3 10.5 II 
I 
Ill. Official Flows/Private Flows(%) -2.8 4341 534.7 1!.2 9.0 14 7.0 -190.8 117.0 20.5 2.9 7.1 -2.7 124.3 
Official Development Finance (millions USS) -24.0 433.7 502.1 222.9 145.5 78.9 94.0 587.4 1183.3 238.2 135.0 196.5 -213.0 338.0 
Total Private Resource Flows {millions USS) 843.0 1000.1 93.9 1982.7 1623.2 5595.4 1346.0 -307.9 !OJ 1.0 1159.4 4711.5 2763.4 7841.0 272.0 
IV. Capital Flow lnstrumenl5 (millions USS) 
Toul Private Flows 843.0 1000.1 93.9 1982.7 1623.2 5595.4 1346.0 -307.9 1011.0 II 59.4 471\.5 2763.4 7841.0 272.0 
Portfolio Flows 0.0 182.9 35.2 670.9 -12.0 120.0 -375.0 1071.2 1166.3 1011.4 3310.2 2595.5 2576.5 -508.0 
Bonds 0.0 182.9 4.5 632.7 -126.0 38.1 210.0 921.2 1166.3 977.4 3297.3 2255.3 2093.7 1050.0 
Equity 0.0 0.0 30.7 38.2 114.0 81.9 -165.0 150.0 0.0 34.0 12.9 340.2 482.8 542.0 
Foreign Direct Investment 207.0 400.0 600.0 654.0 878.0 2568.0 63.0 0.0 1462.0 1479.0 2350.0 1144.0 4519.0 -9.0 
Commercial Banks 414.2 685.9 -165.9 578.1 7!7.0 3195.8 3000.0 -1319.9 -1558.3 -1235.9 -817.6 -749.4 925.2 1700.0 
Other Private Creditors 221.8 -268.7 -375.4 79.7 40.2 -288.4 4244.0 -59.2 -59.0 -95.! -13!.1 -226.7 ·179.7 2505.0 
v. Risk Ratings 
Srandard and l'aar's So\"trl!i1!n Debti?UfiiJ~ 
Foreign Currency Long-term Ratins BBB+ A A BB• BB• BB• BB> BBB-
Outlook Positive Stable Stable Positive Stable Negative Stable 
Table 1: Selected Economic Indicators for Selected Eastern European Countries, 1990-1996 
Czech Republic Hungary 
19901 19911 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 19951 1996 
VL Spread over LIBOR ("!.) -0.3 2.0 3.3 3.7 2.5 1.7 1.0 3.2 4.8 4.3 2.5 0.2 
A.vg Interest RAte of New Commitments to Private Creditors 8.1 8.1 7.2 7.1 7.6 7.8 9.4 9.3 8.7 7.7 7.6 6.3 .. 
VfL Capital Flight(+) (millions USS) .. -1098.8 -1089.0 -3307.8 1816.5 -949.3 -1060.0 -4573.0 370.3 -4027.1 
VIR Fiscallndicaton 
Overall budget deficit(% of GOP) .. 2.7 0.9 0.5 2.1 -5.4 -8.0 -6.4 -3.7 
Debt Service to Government Revenues Ratio .. 11.6 19.3 15.7 23.1 24.6 21.3 26.3 33.1 .. 
Debt Service to Government Expenditures Ratio .. .. 11.7 18.9 15.5 24.9 25.3 21.0 26.0 ]4.0 
IX. Other Indicators 
Real Effective Exchange Rate 100 101.6 109.4 128.3 132.8 135.3 142.7 100.0 110.3 113.1 118.2 112.3 106.2 109.4 
Real GDP growth(%) -1.2 -14.2 -0.4 -0.9 2.6 5.0 -2.5 -6.9 -3.1 -0.6 2.9 1.5 
Gross domestic savings(% ofGDP) 36.8 27.4 20.2 20.1 20.2 22.9 28.0 19.5 15.8 11.8 15.7 20.6 23.4 
Government Consumption (% of GOP) 19.8 18.8 20.7 23.5 22.3 20.3 19.2 10.6 10.6 I 1.4 13.8 12.1 11.4 10.7 
Private Consumption(% of GOP) 44.4 5\.9 56.3 57.6 59.5 57.9 61.4 69.9 72.8 74.4 72.2 68.0 65.9 
Gross Domestic Investment (% of GOP) 28.6 29.9 27.1 18.4 20.4 24.7 30.9 25.4 20.5 16.1 20.0 22.2 22.8 
-'' 
Gro.ss Domestic Fixed Investment(% of GOP) 19.8 15.5 \9.9 21.6 20.0 . ·'. 
- .. 
Current Government Revenues {% of GOP) 51.9 54.4 53.8 52.3 50.8 51.4 
Cwrent Government Expenditures(% of GOP) .. 48.2 52.9 54.6 52.9 50.8 50.6 
E)(;?<Jrts (G&S) (%of GOP) 56.7 52.4 59.3 56.9 32.8 31.5 26.5 28.8 29.6 30.8 
lm?Ort.s {G&S) (% of GOP) 54.5 52.8 63.7 33.8 31.8 34.7 35.7 33.3 33.4 
Current account balance(% of GOP) 2.2 -0.2 -3.1 -8.6 1.1 1.2 0.9 -1\.0 -9.8 -5.8 -3.8 
lm!)uu.d Private Savings(% ofGDP) 15.1 13.7 12.5 15.3 16.3 16.6 
Services, etc., value added(% of GOP) 44.4 44.2 49.2 54.0 55.2 54.6 56.8 49.6 55.0 58.0 60.3 60.8 59.2 59.0 
E:q»>rt.s f.o.b. (mi!Hons US$) 13001.8 14037.2 21476.8 21706.9 9151.3 9687.5 10096.6 8118.7 7648.2 12864.1 14183.8 
A1,1erage Export Growth Rate 1990-95 0.207 0.207 0.207 0.072 0.072 0.072 o.on 0.072 0.072 0.072 
CLlrYentAccount (millions U.S.S) 681.4 -81.1 -1373.7 -266.9 378.6 403.2 351.9 -4262.5 -4053.6 -2535.4 -1411.0 
Current Account Export Ratio 0.052 -0.006 -0.064 -0.012 0.041 0.042 0.035 -0.525 -0.530 -0.197 -0.099 
Deviation (using average annual growth rate 90-95) -0.408 -0.350 -0.401 -0.185 -0.185 -0.179 0.381 0.386 0.053 -0.044 
L!BOR 8.4 6.1 3.9 3.4 5.1 6.1 5.6 8.4 6.1 3.9 3.4 5.1 6.1 5.6 
World GNP growth(annual %) 21 1.0 1.5 1.8 2.8 2.4 2.1 1.0 1.5 1.8 2.8 2.4 
World Exports of goods and services (annual % growth) 6.2 5.1 6.5 5.1 8.9 7.9 6.2 5.1 6.5 5.1 8.9 7.9 
Table 1: Selected Economic Indicators for Selected Eastern European Countries, 1990-1996 
rotan a Kussian 1' eaeratwn 
1990 1991 1992 19931 1994 1995 1996 19901 1991 
""' 
1993 1994 1995 1996 
I, Debt Statistics {millions USS) 
Total Debt Stock 49366.4 53420.5 48494.6 45176.2 42552.9 42291.3 42237.0 59817.0 67590.1 78991.9 112940.4 12192\.1 120460.6 1290\6.0 
!.hng·term debt 39262.7 4500\A 43142.2 41837.0 40367.0 42085.5 4\865.0 48017.0 54972.5 64890.8 102158.0 107748.0 100279.0 \09223.0 
J>ublic and Pubhcally Guaranateed 39262.7 44866.7 42740.8 4\296.5 39503.4 41073.4 40427.0 48017.0 :54972.5 64890.8 102158.0 107748.0 100279.0 108869.0 
Private Nonguarantced 0.0 134.7 401.4 540.5 863.6 1012.0 1438.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 354.0 
PwtJiic and Publieally Guaranteed Debt as a% or Total Long-term 97.91 D<bt 100.0 99.7 99.i 98.7 97.6 96.6 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 99.7 
Private Nonguarantced Debt as a% of Total Long·term Debt 0.0 0.3 0.9 1.3 2.11 2.4 3A 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 
I 
U. Credit Worthiness Indicators(%) 
Tot2l Debt/Exports 251.4 286.4 249.6 246 191.3 127.3 118 73.8 124.5 144.2 171.7 156.7 126.7 131 
Tol.11 Debt/GNP 88.8 72.6 58.7 53.4 46.6 36.1 32 10.4 12.5 18.6 29.5 37.7 37.6 33 
ToLl!! Debt Servicc:!Exporu 4.9 5.2 7.6 9.2 14 12.2 9 14.6 24.9 2.4 3.5 4.7 6.6 7 
Interest Payments/Exports 1.7 3.2 4.8 5.6 5.4 5.4 6 4.8 7.6 0.7 1.2 1.8 3.2 3 
Interest Payments/GNP 0.6 0.8 1.1 1.2 L3 1.5 0.7 0.8 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.9 
lntemational Reservesllmporu (monthly) 3 2 2 2 3 5 5 2.0 1.0 3.0 3 
International Reserves/Total Debt 9.5 7.1 8.8 9.5 14.2 35.4 38 8.7 5.9 15.0 15 
Sl10ort Term/Total Debt 19.4 14.2 9.3 5.9 2 0.5 I 19.7 ]8.7 16.6 7.4 8.2 8.8 6 
Coneessionalrfotal Debt 7.7 6.9 26.8 27.8 25.4 26.2 25 0.0 1.0 1.9 30.3 27.1 18.4 17 
M ultilateral!Total Debt 1.1 1.6 2.4 3.3 4.61 4.9 6 0.7 0.6 0.7 1.2 1.3 1.7 3 
' 
HL Official Flows/Private Flows(%) --69.9 505.0 187.2 50.4 18l.l 65.6 32.6 72.0 2838.3 44.8 114.4 667.0 90.2 627.8 
Official Development Finance (millions USS) -49.7 2703.7 1353.6 1088.5 2253.3 3317.8 1976.0 4032.7 6357.7 4710.9 3534.9 1964.3 1005.9 4533.0 
1'<1tal Private Resource Flows (millions USS) 71.1 535.4 722.9 2158.4 1244.0 5057.6 6066.0 5603.9 224.0 10508.4 3090.1 294.5 Ill 5.5 722.0 
IV. C~pital Flow Instruments (millions USS) i 
Total Private Flows 71.1 535.4 722.9 2158.4 1244.0 5057.6 6066.0 5603.9 224.0 10508.4 3090.1 294.5 1115.5 722.0 
Portfolio Flows 0.0 0.0 0.0 399.5 142.5 1171.0 1730.0 310.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 236.7 -669.1 -982.0 
Ilonds 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 137.6 249.9 160.0 310.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 -34.1 -810.\ 1900.0 
Equity 0.0 0.0 0.0 399.5 4.9 921.1 I 570.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 00 270.8 141.0 918.0 
foreign Direct Investment 89.0 291.0 678.0 1715.0 1875.0 3659.0 4200.0 0.0 0.0 700.0 700.0 637.0 2017.0 938.0 
C<lrnmercial Banks -100.4 98.2 42.5 135.8 -783.8 309.4 93.0 -3675.5 -3042.2 1367.4 -387.8 -70.0 0.0 !000.0 
Other Private Creditors 82.5 !46.2 2.4 -91.9 10.3 -81.8 43.0 8969.2 3266.2 8441.0 2777.9 -509.2 -232.4 3578.0 
\'. Risk Ratings 
Standard and Poor'.s Sov~r~ign D~bl Rating 
fordt;n Currency Long-term Rating .. BB BBB-
.. BB-
Outlook Positive Stable Stable 
Table 1: Selected Economic Indicators for Selected Eastern European Countries, 1990-1996 
Poland Russian Federation 
19901 1991 1992 1993 19941 1995 1996 19901 1991 1992 199) 19941 19951 1996 
VI. Spread over UBOR 0.1 2.7 2.4 3.3 1.61 1.7 -0.05 1.7 2.4 0.8 -0.4 1.3 
Avg Interest Rate of New Commitments to Private Creditors .., 8 8 6.3 6.7 6.7 7.8 8.3 7.8 6.3 4.2 4.7 7.4 
\'11. Capital Flight(+) (millions USS) .. .. 6919.4 2745.4 -8658.8 -9124.0 -6755.9 22295.1 -1399.6 
Vlll. Fiscal Indicators 
Oven II budget deficit/surplus(% of GOP) -2.3 -!.8 -2.8 -21.8 -8.7 -11.3 -61 -8.5 
Debt Service to Current Revenues Ratio 3.0 3.9 4.2 7.1! 7.4 0.4 6.2 5.4 5.4 
Debt Service to Current Expenditures Ratio 2.8 3.7 4.2 7.1 i 7.4 0.3 5.6 4.9 4.3 . 
I I 
lX. Other 
Re.al Effective Exchange Rate !00.0 132.4 123.9 132.9 132.3: 137.8 143.1 .. 46.3 [00.0 180.6 232.1 311.0 
Real GOP grcwth (%) -!0.8 -6.3 2.0 3.7 4.61 6.6 -3.6 -5.0 -14.5 -8.7 -12.6 -4.0 
Gro;s domestic savings(% ofGDP) 32.8 18.0 16.7 16.5 16.9i 18.6 16.7 31.9 39.4 38.4 35.0 29.1 25.6 28.2 
Go"llcmment Consumption(% ofGDP) \9.3 24.1 25.2 20.4 18.81 !8.2 17.3 20.8 15.0 13.7 20.0 20.9 15.9 11.2 
Pri"llalc Consumption(% ofGDP) 48.0 57.9 58.1 63.0 64.3j 63.2 66.0 47.4 45.61 47.9 45.0 50.0 58.4 60.6 
Grosl Domestic In"lleStmcnt (% ofGDP) 25.6 \9.9 15.2 15.6 15.91 !7.0 20.6 30.1 36.4 33.4 31.0 27.0 :!5.0 24.0 
Gros.s Domestic Fixed Investment(% ofGDP) !9.9 15.21 15.6 t 5.9 18.3 19.8 23.3 23.9 20.4 21.8 20.5 20.5 
C\mc:nt Government Revenues(% ofGDP) I 42.1 44.71 46.8 47.21 46.6 44.7 43.6 38.6 36.71 32.7 28.8 
-
Current Government Expenditures(% ofGDP) 45.7 46.6 46.7 47.4 I 46.6 45.9 57.9 42.7 40.71 33.6 32.5 
Exports (GNFS) (% ofGDP) .. 23.5 23.7 22.9 24.01 24.9 25.5 55.6 35.5 
"•I 263 22.3 
Imports (GNFS) (% ofGDP) 25.4 22.2 22.0 23.0i 24.8 27.5 50.4 31.6 23.1 23.6 18.1 
Current account balance(% ofGDP) 5.2 -2.8 -3.7 
-6 71 -2.8. -3.6 -1.0 0.7 0.9 0.1 0.7 3.ol 2.8 2.7 
Impi.IIed Private Savings(% ofGDP) 21.6 18.6 16.4 17.1 !8.4 19.0 43.4 28.4 31.1 24.1 28.4 
Ser·1iccs, etc., value added(% ofGDP) 41.6 46.1 52.0 53.4 53.8 54.1 35.8 39.6 46.4 44.7 54.6 49.0 49.0 
Exports f.o.b. (millions US$) 15837.0 14393.0 13929.0 13582.0 17121.0 23463.0 24440.0 67716.0 81496.0 98299.0 
A"llc:f"llge Export Grol-'o1.h Rate (1990-95) 0.108 0.108 0.108 0.108 0.108! 0.108 0.108 0.205 0.205 
Cunent Account (millions U.S.$) 3067 -2146 -3104 
-5788 -2590j -4245 -1352 11328 9499 11806 
C1.1nent Account Export Ratio 0.194 -0.149 -0.223 -0.426 -0.151 -0.181 0.167 0.117 
Deviation (using average annual gro\\1.h rate 90-95) 
-o.o:n -0.067 0.007 0.210 -0.064 -0.035 
-0.526 
LIB OR 8.4 6.1 3.9 3.4 5.1 6.1 5.6 8.4 6.1 3.9 3.4 5.1 6.1 5.6 
W<Hid GNP growth (annual%) 2.1 1.0 1.5 1.8 2.8 2.4 2.1 1.0 1.5 1.8 2.8 2.4 
World Exports of goods and services (annual% growth) 6.2 5.1 6.5 5.1 8.91 7.9 6.2 5.1 6.5 5.1 8.9 7.9 
Table 2: Selected Economic Indicators for Selected Latin-American Countries, 1978-1983 
Mexico Venezuela 
19?81 1979 19801 19811 1982 1983 1978 19791 1980 1981 19821 1983 
I. Debt Stllti.oitics (millions USS) 
Total Debt Stock 35712.3 42773.9 57377.7 78215.2 86080.6 92973.9 16577.4 24056.2 29344.4 32121.6 32158.0 38302.8 
Long-tenn debt 30467.4 34614.0 4\214.7 53232.2 59650.7 81566.7 8575.5 12282.2 13794.9 15140.8 \7449.6 237&7.3 
Public and Publically Guaranateed 255\2.6 290\4.0 33914.7 43032.2 51550.7 66766.7 6708.5 9757.2 10613.9 11540.8 12449.61 \4828.3 
Private Nonguaranteed 4954.8 5600.0 7300.0 \0200.0 8100.0 14800.0 1867.01 2525.0 3181.0 3600.0 5000.0 8959.0 
Public and Publically Guaranteed Debt as a o/o of Total Long-
term Debt 83.7 83.8 82.3 80.8 86.4 81.9 182 79.4 76.9 76.2 7\J 62.3 
Private Nonguaranteed Debt as a% of Total Long-term Debt 16.3 16.2 17.7 19.2 13.6 I &.1 2 1.& 20.6 23.1 23.8 28.7 37.7 
Il, Credit Worthine-ss Indicators("/.) 
Total Debt/Exports 243.4 232.4 253.2 280 284.2 152.7 147.5 132 131 159.81 220.9 
Total Debt/GNP 33.5 30.8 30.5 32.6 53.5 66.6 34.5 41.7 42.1 40.9 41.4 48.4 
Total Debt ServicdExports 66.0 44.4 46.4 51 45.3 9 19.1 27.2 23.2 29.5 26.8 
Interest Payments/Exports 19.2 24.6 3!.6 36.3 30.6 4.6 5.1 \3.8 12.9 17.5 17.4 
Interest Payments/GNP 2.1 2.4 3.2 4 I 6.9 7.2 1.0 1.41 4.4 4.0 4.5 3.8 
International Reserves/Imports (monthly) 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.4 1.5 4.4 7.1 6.5 5.3 4.1 7.9 
International Reservesffotal Debt 6.4 7.2 7.3 6.4 2.1 5.2 5 !.9 54.8 45.5 39.6 36.7 31.4 
Short Termffotal Debt 13.8 18.8 28.2 31.9 30.4 10.9 48.3 i 48.9 
" 
52.9 45.7 37.9 
Concessionalrfotal Debt 1.6 1.2 0.9 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.9 0.5 0.4 OJ 0.21 0.2 
--
MultilateralfTotal Dt:bt 6.6 6.4 5.6 4.7 55 4.5 1.7 1.0 0.7 06 0.5 0.4 
III. Official Flows!Private Flows ("/•) 5.2 6.0 9.9 6.5 2!.2 -7.4 -1.1 -0.9 1.1 -0.2 -0.7 -0.6 
Official Development Finance (millions US$) 264.2 309.41 809.4 947.4 1696.1 -22&.8 -25.9 -36.0 19.4 -3.1 -6.9 -8.8 
Total Private Resource Flows (millions US$) 5102.9 5130.1 8181.6 14535.0 8003.9 3093.2 2269.7 3873.5 1824.7 1653.4 959.2 1457.4 
IV. Capital Flow Instruments (millions USS) 
Total Private Flows 5102.9 5130.1 8181.6 14535.0 8003.9 3093.2 2269.7 3873.5 !824.7 1653.4 959.21 1457.4 
Portfolio Flows 623.8 -15.9 112.3 1508.8 993.1 -435.8 501.5 -10.4 262.6 !69.7 -108.1 -32.8 
Bonds 623.8 -15.9 112.3 1373.8 993.1 -435.8 501.5 -10.4 262.6 169.7 -108.1 -32.8 
Equity 0.0 0.0 0.0 135.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Foreign Direct Investment 823.8 1332.0 2156.01 2835.0 1655.0 46!.0 67.0 88.0 55.0 184.0 257.0 86.0 
Commercial Banks 3702.9 3828.0 5880.2 9876.3 5319.0 2647.6 1646.4 3763.1 1693.7 1306.7 525.8 1163.5 
Other Private Creditors 
-47.6 -14.0 33.1 314.9 36.8 420.4 54.8 32.8 -186.6 -7.0 284.5 240.7 
V. Risk Ratings I 
Srundard and /'uur'!.-SMUeign Deb! Uaring 
Foreign Cunency Long-tenn Rating 
.. AAA AAA AAA AA 88 
Outlook 
.. 
Table 2: Selected Economic Indicators for Selected Latin-American Countries, 1978-1983 
Mexico Venezuela 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982[ 1983 1978[ 1979 1980 1981 198Z 1983 
Vl. Spread ov~r LIBOR 0.9 -0.05 -1.4 -0.4 1.5 1.0 -1.0 1.1 -1.7 0.2 2.4 1.6 
Average Interest Rate of New Commitments to Private 
Creditors 10.1 12.1 12.6 \6.3 15.1 10.9 8.2 13.3 12.3 16.9 16.0 I 1.5 
Vll. Capital Flight(+) (millions USS) 149\.6 3508.8 3355.5 5)::!:9.4 9657.3 1133.9 3700.8 6261.2 6798.2 39<15.4 10138.8 
VIII. Flseallndicators 
Overall budget deficit, including grants{% of GDP) -2.5 .].\ -3.0 -6.4 -14.8 -7.6 -3.3 1.6 0.0 -1.2 -3.7 -1.3 
Debt Service to Government Revenues Ratio 67.3 71.3 36.8 37.61 57.7 56.0 9.8 26.2 39.0 25.1 30.5 25.8 
Debt Service to Government Expenditures Ratio 53.1 60.8 30.8 26.3 32.7 38.4 9.0 29.8 46.4 28.9 30.2 27.2 
i 
lX. Other i 
Real EtTective Exchange Rate 126.9 134.2 146.2 162.61 118.2 llO.I 168.53 163.71 172.90 191.03 208.98 222.04 
Real GOP growth(%) 8.2 9.2 8.5 8.7[ -0.7 -4.1 2.4 0.8 -4.5 -0.3 -2.1 -3.8 
Gross domestic savings{% ofGDP) 20.7 22.3 24.9 24.91 28.0 30.3 32.7 34.5 33.3 29.3 25.1 20.5 
Government Consumption (% of GOP) 9.9 10.0 10.0 10.8[ 10.5 8.8 11.7 11.2 11.8 12.7 12.5 11.8 
Private Consumption(% of GOP) 69.4 67.7 65.0 643[ 61.6 60.9 55.6 54.3 54.9 57.9 62.4 67.6 
Gross J)Qmestic Investment{% of GOP) 22.3 24.7 27.2 27.41 22.9 20.8 43.9 33.2 26.4 24.4 27.7 12.2 
Gross Domestic Fixed Investment(% of GOP) 21.1 23.4 24.2 25.7i 22.2 17.3 42.5[ 31.6 25.2 24.5 24.1 19.1 
Current Govemment Revenues(% of GOP) 19.6 27.1 20.0 204[ 23.8 27.2 2691 25.8 27.6 35.3 28.7 27.8 
Current Govemmenl Expenditures(% of GOP) 17.9 19.1 20.2 21.4i 29.8 27.5 \8.31 16.7 17.9 20.8 23.1 23.0 
Exports (GNFS) (%of GOP) 9.9 10.4 11.8 11.71 16.2 18.2 20.4 26.0 28.8 26.8 22.2 19.5 
Imports (GNFS) {% of GOP) 10.5 11.8 14.4 13.7 11.6 8.6 31.2 24.3 21.7 21.9 24.8 11.2 
Current account balance(% of GOP) -3.8 -5.3 -6 5! -3.4 3.9 -11.9 60.7 6.8 5.1 -5.4 5.5 
Imputed Private Savings {% of GOP) 18.7 13.9 21.7 24.7! 32.7 27.4 23.1 24.0 22.6 15.0 16.0 22.6 
Services, etc., value added{% of GOP) 59.5 59.9 59.0 59.9 61.5 58.6 52.1 48.9 48.8 50.7 53.3 55.7 
Exports f.o.b. {millions USS) 11512.0 18031.0 23307.0 24056.0 25953.0 9174.0 14360.0 \9275.0 20181.0 16516.0 14759.0 
Average Annual Export Growth 1978-83 0.242 0.242 0.242 0.242 0.103 0.103 0.\03 0.103 0.103 0.103 
Current Account (millions U.S.$) -5409.0 -10422.0 -16240.0 -5889.0 5866.0 -5735.0 350.0 4728.0 4000 0 -4246.0 4427.0 
Current Account Export Ratio -0.470 -0.578 -0.697 -0.245 0.226 0.625 -0.024 -0.245 -0.198 0.257 -0.300 
Deviation {using annual export growth) .. -0.555 0.112 0.181 -0.384 -0.525 -1.106 -0.439 0.104 0.]06 0.513 
Deviation (using average annual growth rate 90-95) 0.093 0.212 -0.240 -0.711 -0.831 -0.181 0.040 -0.007 -0.462 0.095 
LIB OR 9.2 12.2 14.0 16.7 13.6 9.9 9.2 12.2 14.0 16.7 13.6 9.9 
World GNP growth {annual%) 4.1 3.7 24 1.0 0.2 2.8 4.1 3.7 24 1.0 0.2 28 
World Exports of goods and services (annual% growth) 5.7 7.4 4.3 3.6 ·1.2 3.5 5.7 7.4 4.3 3.6 -1.2 3.5 
Table 2: Selected Economic Indicators for Selected Latin-American Countries, 1978-1983 
Argentina Brazil 
1978 1979[ 1980[ 1981 1982 1983 1978[ 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
1. Debt Statistics (millions USS) 
otal Debt Stock \3276.1 20949.8 27157.0 3$657.5 43634.2 45919.7 54563.4 61326.6 71520.1 81447.7 93925.8 98518.8 
Long-tenn debt 9848.1 14038.8 16773.6 22736.2 27113.2 35833.0 47485.7 52683.8 57980.6 66095.3 75892.2 81612.4 
Public and Publically Guaranateed 6746.1 8600.0 10180.6 10570.2 15886.2 25440.0 31333.9 368\9.7 41375.3 46303.7 52768.6 60100 4 
Private Nonguaranteed 3102.0 5438.8 6593 0 \2166.0 I 1227.0 10393.0 )6]5\_8 15864.1 16605.3 19791.6 231236 21512.0 
Public and Publically Guaranteed Debt as a% of Total Long-tenn 
D<bt 68.5 61.3 60.7 465 58.6 71.0 66.0 69.9 71.4 70.1 69.5 73 6 
Private Nonguaranteed Debt as a% of Total Long-tenn Debt 31.5 38.7 39.3 53.5 41.4 29_0 34.0 30' 28.6 29.9 30_5 26.4 
II. Credit Worthiness Indicators(%) 
Total Debt/Exports 169.4 211.3 242.4 302.1 447.3 470.3 376.6 340.6 306.5 301.7 399.6 404.4 
Total Debt/GNP 23 30.5 35.6 46.4 55.1 46.8 29.7 28.6 31.2 32_4 35.0 51.5 
Total Debt Service/Exports 42.3 22.7 37.3 45.7 50 69.7 58.1 62.8 63.3 66.2 81.8 54_6 
Interest Payments!Expons 9.8 9.7 20.8 29.1 36.7 55.7 22.1 26_6 33_9 38.7 49.5 39.5 
Interest Payments/GNP 1.3 1.4 3.' 4 5 4.5 5.5 1.7 2.2 3 5 4.2 43 5 
International Reserves/Imports (monthly) 8.2 9.2 4.8 2.5 3.1 1.9 4.7 2.9 1.6 1.6 0.8 1.2 
International ReservesfTotal Debt 44_7 55.5 34.2 
"' 
]0_3 6.2 22.3 16 9.6 9.2 4.3 4.6 
Short TennfTota! Debt 25.8 33 38.2 36.2[ 37.9 19.4 tl 14.1 18.9 18.8 18.6 14.5 
--Concessiona!fTotal Debt 3.6 2.5 1.8 1.2 0.9 0.5 3.8 3.2 2.6 2.2 1.9 1.7 
Multilateratrrotal Debt 6.8 4.8 4 3.4 3 3.4 4.3 4.5 4.3 4.2 4.4 5.2 
III. Official Flows/Private Flows(%) 28_4 5.1 1.7 1.0 1.6 25.3 6.0 5 8 14.8 12.3 9.4 37.7 
Official Development Finance (millions US$) 338.5 231.0 59.5 70.1 95.9 333.7 659.6 445.8 838_8 1236.5 990.9 1591.6 
Total Private Resource Flows (millions US$) 1191.8 4539.6 3475.4 7163.5 5892.1 1319.0 10943.9 7655.6 5655.5 10031.6 10489.8 42! 8.9 
lV. Capital Flow Instruments (millions USS) 
Total Private Flows 1191.8 4539.6 3475.4 7163 sl 5892.1 1319.0 10943.9 7655.6 5655.5 10031.6 10489.8 4218.9 
Portfolio Flows 238.2 -66.2 -41.8 -43.3 3314.1 -34.0 926.9 635.0 346_0 -57.1 -158.7 -237.0 
Bonds 238.2 -66.2 -41.8 -43.3 33\4.1 -34.0 926.9 635.0 346.0 -57.1 -158.7 -237.0 
Equity 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 00 0.0 
Foreign Direct Investment 250.0 206.0 678.0 837.0 227.0 185.0 2006.0 2419.0 1911.0 2520.0 2910_0 1560.0 
Commercial Banks 230.7 4336_5 2854.8 6161.7 2155.8 1304.5 7391.6 3995.3 2618.3 7611.8 6603.3 2503.7 
Other Private Creditors 472.9 63.3 -15.6 208. I 195.2 -136.5 6194 606.3 780.2 -43.1 1135.2 392.2 
V. Risk IUtings 
Standard and Poor's Sovereign Debt Raring 
F1>reign Currency Long-tenn Rating 
Uut ook 
Table 2: Selected Economic Indicators for Selected Latin-American Countries, 1978-1983 
Argentina Brazil 
19781 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
\.1. Spread over LIBOR 0.9 -0.05 0.3 -4.2 -2.3 2.5 0.8 -<l4 -1.1 -<l.3 -0.9 1.4 
lAverage lnte~st Rate of New Commitments to Private 10.1 12.1 14.3 12.5 11.3 12.4 10 11.8 12.9 164 12.7 11.3 
Creditors 
\'II. Capital flight(+) (millions USS} 1986.8 3007.7 4\26.2 7093.5 6323.7 1053.5 12526.4 6763.2 10193.5 9927.6 12478.1 4593.0 
VIIJ. Fiscal indicators 
Overall budget deficil, including grants(% of GOP) 0.0 0.0 -2 6 -6.7 -5.0 -7.9 0.0 0.0 -2.2 -2.2 -2.7 -4.0 
Debt Service to Government Revenues Ratio 3\.S 45.2 70.6 140.9 136.7 18.3 22.5 28.0 27.7 27.2 24.8 
Debt Service to Government Expenditures Ratio 21.2 27.8 31.0 33.4 32.6 30.8 
LX. Other 
Real Effective Exchange Rate 123.61 169.71 199.48 186.96 132.52 122.60 88.8 80.0 71.8 88.1 95.7 73.2 
Real GOP growth(%) -4.5 8.9 3.7 -5.9 -3.2 3.8 3.2 6.8 9.1 -4.4 0.6 -3.4 
Gross domestic savings (%of GDP) 30.7 26.0 23.8 22.2 24.3 24.2 21.8 20.7 2l.l 22.7 20 4 19.1 
Government Consumption (%of GOP) l 1.2 11.0 9.7 9.7 92 93 \0.0 9.7 
Private Consumption (% of GOP) 58.1 63.0 68.6 69.5 69.7 68.0 69.6 71.2 
Gross Domestic Investment(% ofGDP) 27.8 25.9 25.3 22.7 21.8 20.9 23.0 22.8 23.3 23.1 21.1 16.7 
Gross Domestic Fixed Investment(% ofGDP) 22 22 0 22.8 20.1 15.4 14.1 24.4% 22.3% 21.8% 21.2% 21.2% 16.1% 
Current Government Revenues(% of GOP) 36.2 33.1 35.5 34.6 32.3 34.2 28.2% 27.9% 29.9% 31.8% 32.0% 
Current Government Expenditures(% of GOP) 30.8 29.9 34.4 39.3 39.6 41.0 29.6% 29.9% 32.9% 35.3% 35.6% 
Exports (GNFS) (%of GOP) 13.5 12.2 11.4 12.9 14.1 14.7 6.4% 6.8% 8.5% 9.0% 7.6% 11.2% 
Imports (GNFS) (%of GOP) 8.8 12.7 18.3 17.7 10.8 10.0 7.6% 8.8% \0.6% 9.4% 8.2% 8.9% 
Current account balance (%of GDP) 3.2 -0.8 -63 ~6.1 -2.8 -2.3 -3.5 -4.7 -5.5 -4.5 -5.8 -34 
Imputed Private Savings(% ofGDP) 21.3 18.3 14.8 20.0 26.0 25.6 2!.7% 21.7% 23.9% 24.0% 22.2% 
Services, etc., value added{% of GOP) 46.4 48.2 53.2 49.3 49.8 48.3 48.3 45.2 45.5 45.4 45.1 
Exports f.o.b. (millions US$) 6401.0 7810.0 8021.0 9143.0 7623.0 7835.0 12473.0 15244.0 20132.0 23276.0 20173.0 21898.0 
Average Annual Export Growth 1978~83 0.064 0.064 0.064 0.064 0.064 0.064 0.116 0.116 0.116 0.116 0.116 0.116 
Current Account (millions U.S.$) 1856 -513 -4774 -4712 -2353 -2436 -6996.0 -10516.0 -12831.0 -11764.0 -16317.0 -6834.0 
Current Account Export Ratio 0.290 -0.066 ~0.595 -0.515 -0.309 -0.311 -0.561 -0.690 -0.637 -0.505 -0.809 -0.312 
Deviation (using average annual growth rate 90-95) -0.417 -0.061 0.468 0.388 0.182 0.184 0.328 0.457 0.405 0.273 0.576 0.080 
UBOR 9.2 12.2 14.0 16.7 13.6 9.9 9.2 12.2 14.0 16.7 13.6 9.9 
World GNP growth (annual%) 4.1 3.7 24 1.0 0.2 2.8 4.1 3.7 2.4 1.0 02 2.8 
World Exports of goods and services (annual% growth) 5.7 7.4 4.3 3.6 -1.2 3.5 5.7 7.4 4.3 3.6 -1.2 3.5 
Notes on Sources and Calculations for Tables 1 and 2. 
Sections I (Debt Statistics) and II (Credit Worthiness Indicators) 
Data was extracted from the 1997 Global Development Finance CD-ROM. Data for 1996 are 
preliminary and from the World Bank Debtor Reporting System. 
Section III (Official Flows/Private Flows) and IV (Capital Flow Instruments) 
Data was obtained from the World Bank Debtor Reporting System. Data for 1996 are 
preliminary. 
Section V (Risk Ratings) 
Data on sovereign debt ratings from Standard and Poor's Creditweek International, various 
issues and Standard and Poor's Research Office Ratings Desk. We used the rating from 
December of each year. AAA indicates an extremely strong capacity to pay interest and 
principal. AA indicates a strong capacity to repay. BBB indicates an adequate capacity to repay. 
BB, B, C, CC, CCC indicates a speculative ability to repay where BB indicates the lowest 
degree of speculation and CCC the highest. A plus or minus represent relative standing within a 
rating category. 
Data on Country Risk Ratings from Euromoney, various issues. A lower rating (ranking) means 
lower credit risk. 
Section VI (Spread Over Libor) 
Average Interest Rate was obtain from the 1997 Global Development Finance CD-ROM. Data 
for 1996 is not available. 
LIB OR the average London Interbank Offered Rate on 6 month U.S. dollar deposits, was 
obtained from the IMF International Finance Statistics. 
Section VII (Capital Flight) 
Capital Flight was calculated using the World Bank Method: 
Capital Flight= Current Account Balance+ Net Equity Flows+ Change in Reserves + Change in 
External Debt. A negative number indicates a net outflow while a positive number indicates a 
net inflow. Data from IMF Balance of Payment Statistics Yearbook, various years and 1997 
Global Development Finance CD. See Claessens and Naude (1993) for further explanation of 
capital flight calculations. 
Section VIII (Fiscal Indicators) 
Government Expenditures, Revenues, and overall budget deficit(% of GDP) calculated from 
various World Bank Country Economic Reports. 
Total Debt Service from 1997 Global Development Finance CD-ROM. Data for 1996 is not 
available. 
Section IX (Other Indicators) 
Real Effective Exchange Rate from JP Morgan's broad measure currency basket of22 OECD 
currencies and 23 LDC currencies. The series for the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and the 
Russian Federation are based on more limited currency baskets and are not strictly comparable to 
other countries. 
Current Account Balance is from IMF Balance of Payment Statistics Yearbook, various years. 
Real GOP Growth, Gross Domestic Savings, Government Consumption, Private Consumption, 
Current Account Balance, Gross Domestic Investment, Services, value added (all as a% of 
GOP), World GNP Growth and World Exports of Goods and Services are from the 1997 World 
Development Indicators CD-ROM. Figures for 1996 are preliminary estimates. 
Gross Domestic Fixed Investment, Current Government Revenues, Current Government 
Expenditures, Export and Imports of Goods and Nonfactor Services (all as a percent of GOP) are 
estimates. 
Imputed Private Savings was calculated as Gross Domestic Fixed Investment- (Government 
Revenue- Government Expenditures)+ (Exports- Imports). 
Deviation= Current Account Deficit/Exports- 2 *(Average Annual Export Growth Rate) 
A general rule of thumb for assessing the sustainability of the current account deficit is the 
foreign liabilities to export ratio should not be greater than 2, so in the long run a sustainable 
current account deficit as a proportion of exports equals twice the export growth rate. See 
Dadush and Brahmbhatt (1995) and Dadush, Dhareshwar and Johannes (1994 ). 
Exports f.o.b., LIBOR and Current Account Deficit from IMF International Finance Statistics, 
VariOUS ISSUeS. 
